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INTRODUCTION
The Landing Point Designator (LPD) configuration and its operational
application have been the subject of much discussion during the past
three years. The trend of design growth has carried the LPD fr n the
original telescope-reticle control device as proposed by MIT, to the
present window-scribed grid design. Although the general function of
•
	
	
the LPD is obvious, insufficient work has been done to describe the
details of operational application or to determine the requirements of
installation or performance. The work of Allan Klumpp at MIT, reference
1, has led to a concept of incremental inputs to the LEM computer to
effect a redesignation of the landing site. This concept appears quite
promising but requires supporting analysis that determines the trade-off
between required accuracy, number of redesignation corrections (crew task
loading) and fuel penalty. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss the
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relationship of these factors and to develop to a greater extent the logic
of the LPD use.
LANDING POINT DESIGNATION OPERATION
General - The general function of the LPD is illustrated in figure 1.
The LEM onboard guidance system is initially instructed as to the desired
landing site. As the LEM guidance system steers to the desired site, it
computes the line-of-sight LOS to the site and displays the value of LOS
to the pilot. The crew in turn uses an optical device to look along the
computed line-of-sight to the intended landing position. Because of
accumulated navigation errors in the guidance system due to lunar orbit
navigation errors and inertial system drift, the guidance system LOS will
be directed to other than the desired site. The pilot notes the discrep-
ancy between the LOS to the desired landing site and the landing site that
will be obtained without correction to the guidance. The magnitude of
this discrepancy is input to the guidance system and, assuming no error in
the input and neglecting subsequent navigation errors, the guidance system
will then take the LEM to the desired landing point.
Optical (LPD) System Description - The optical device referred to in the
previous section has evolved to be a pattern of scribed lines on the outer
and inner surface of the LEM window. The general configuration as con-
ceived by GAEC of the scribed lines and their relationship to the window
are shown in figures 2(a), (b), and (c). The lines when viewed by the
pilot in effect, form a lubber line parallel to the LEM X-axis with
graduations marks depicting elevation angles measured sequentially down
from a reference line that is parallel to the LEM axis.
Error Sources - There are four major error sources known to be associated
with the LPD operation; a) TMU alinement errors, b) boresight errors, c)
optical application errors and d) absolute altitude errors. Discussion
of these errors follows:
2a. IMU alinement errors - The guidance system will be referenced
to the IMU to determine LOS angles to the landing sight and therefore
misalinement of the INN will contribute angular errors to the LPD opera-
tion. Assuming an alinement of the IMU 15 minutes prior to initiating
Lowered descent, an average 3 .-'- IMU misalinement during the terminal
portion of the descent trajection (when the LPD is likely to be used) will
be about 0.150 . The direction of the misalinement should be assumed non-
.	 predictable prior to the descent but will be approximately (some variation
with time) constant during the descent.
b. The boresight error is the incremental relative angular alinement
between the navigation base and the LPD grid marking on the window. 	 This
error results from manufacturing and installation tolerances and possibly
from bending of the structure including the window due to pressurization
and/or acceleration forces. 	 This error should be amenable to calibration
on the ground prior to flight and possibly to calibration in flight.
	 Con-
sidering that compensation of calibrated boresight errors will be made, an
estimate of jT	boresight error (3r) is considered reasonable.	 The uncom-
' pensatable portion of this error is nonpredicta.ble prior to the descent
but will be approximately (some variation with descent engine thrust-to-
weight ratio) constant during the descent.
c.	 The optical application error is believed to be the predominant
LPD error source.	 It is due primarily to the error of the pilot in inter-
preting the target area relationship to the grid markings. 	 The close
proximity of the grid markings on the inner and outer window surface in
itself will make it very difficult to exactly aline the markings. 	 In
addition, when the pilot focuses his eyes on the target landing area, the
grid markings, being close to the pilot's eyes will be out of focus and
perhaps difficult to keep alined.	 GAEC has run an initial evaluation
using untrained subjects and a 2-degree LPD graduation. 	 This evaluation
yreported in LMO- 480-31'.5 indicated a 3,f error of 1.05 deg.	 It is expected
that this error could be considerably reduced by having one degree grad-
uation	 and using subjects properly trained (as the astronauts would be)
for the task.	 The present status of tests being conducted by the Guidance
and Control Division indicates inat a 3-f error of 0.5 degree can be
expected and formal reporting is in progress.	 The vibration of the LEM
during powered flight may further contribute to the difficulties of the
pilct in obtaining accurate LPD application. 	 The assessment of this prob-
lem must await a definition of the LEM vibration environment and an ade-
quate test facility.	 There are no known plans for such tests.
d. The LPD error associated with absolute altitude errors due to
terrain height difference between the landing site and current position
is illustrated in figure 3. Because of the relatively low flight, path
angle during the approach, the altitude error leads to a landing point
r	 designation error approximately four times the absolute altitude uncer-
tainty. The figure shows the effect of terrain variation relative to
the landing site but the error could also originate from landing radar
inaccuracy or from the inertial system when the landing radar weighting
function does not predominate.
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ANALYSIS AND D-CUSSION
Assumptions - An analysis of the utilization of the LPD involves con-
sideration of the system errors, system constraints such as the minimum
increment of LPD change and the logic or ground rules applied by the
pilot. Because the latter two factors have not been firmly established,
it was necessary -to make certain assumptions to facilitate the analysis.
These assumptions are as follows:
a. Due to the approach geometry the LPD azimuth errors are less
critical than LPD elevation errors, therefore the analysis is limited
to errors in elevation only.
b. Changes in the LPD reading will be made in increments of
2 degree only.
c. An LPD change will be made by the pilot only when the apparent
error is 2 degree or greater.
d. All LPD errors are bias errors as opposed to random errors.
LPD Application Geometry - With the preceeding assumptions the LPD error
at one point on the trajectory results in a fixed-range error on the
surface that is purely a geometrical function of the angle of the approach
path and the angular magnitude of the LPD error. As the LEM proceeds
down its flight path, this range error subtends an LPD angle that grows
almost linearly and inversely with altitude. Assuming a nominal flight
..
	
	 path of -14 degrees, this geometric growth of LPD error is pictured on
figure 4. An example shown on the figure considers the case of 0.5 degree
error at 8,000 feet altitude. The initial range error is 1140 ft and by
the time the altitude reaches 4,000 ft., this range error subtends an 	 _￿
angle of 1 degree. This 1 degree error appears as only 2 degree error to
the pilot because of his 2 degree total systern error and he would redesig-
nate by 2 degree. The process then repeats at 2,000 ft altitude and so on
down as shown on figure 4 until below 1,000 ft altitude the range error
represented by z degree approached 100 ft. Note that a total of 4 redesig-
nation are made before the error is less than 100 feet.
If the bias error is 1.0 degree, the stair-stepping sequence repeats more
often as shown in figure 4 and a total of 6 redesignations are made - the
last being at about 500 ft altitude and the error has not yet been lowered
to 100 ft. It is apparent that the number of redesignations is directly
dependent upon the magnitude of the bias error, the minimum increment of
correction and the logic of how the correction is applied. These examples
are obviously over simplified because operational logic would indicate
¢
	
	 that if the corrections are being made in the same direction, a bias is
present that would at least deserve an extra unit of correction. Such
r
	
	 logic would reduce the number of redesignations and would tend to mini-
mize the unknown bias.
4Fuel penalty as a function of landing point redesignation - In order to
assess the relative cost of descent engine fuel with LPD errors, the work
of reference 2 was extended to determine variatioi.: of the parameter
characteristic velocity per degree (and per foot) of landing point redesig-
nation with both altitude and downrange distance. These variations are
shown in figures 5 and 6 for single and double redesignations, respectively.
From figure 5(a), it is evident that a fuel (delta V) penalty is incurred
-	
for redesignating downrange and a fuel saving may be incurred if the range
is shortened. Relatively speaking, the penalty is slightly more to go
further downrange than is saved by shortening the range a like amount. As
•	 the altitude is decreased, the results indicate that the fuel penalty, delta
V per degree of redesignation is decreasing, but from figure 5(b), it is
evident that the actual penalty per foot of redesignation is increasing.
The results shown in figure 6(a) and (b) show that if a major redesignation
is made at an altitude of 8,000 ft, the magnitude and variation of the
characteristic velocity parameter will be markedly changed fcr a subsequent
redesignation at lower altitudes. Thus, if a figure such as figure 6 were
to be used for assessing fuel costs, it would have application only to a
specific case. Figures 5 and 6 provide information that affords apprecia-
tion of the LPD probl= but does not provide a good means of assessing
the general picture of LPD error costs.
Fuel penalty variation with LPD error - To determine relative costs of
redesignations with LPD errors, a series of runs were made for LPD error
magnitude of 0, +2 degree and +1 degree. The series of runs were con-
ducted first where no gross redesignation was made and the corrections
started at 8,000 ft, the second series had a gross redesignation of 8,000
ft downrange at 8,000 ft altitude, and the third series had a gross
redesignation of 16,000 ft drnmrange at 8,000 ft altitude. In each case
the error was applied at the initial redesignation and was considered as
a bias for each subsequent redesignation. The error was then allowed to
grow to 2 degree greater than the bias error before a subsequent redesig-
nation correction was made. The first correction made below 1,000 ft of
altitude was made with zero error.
The results of the analysis are shown in table 1. These results show
rather clearly that negative LPD errors are more costly than positive
LPD errors and in fact, positive LPD errors actually lead to a relative
fuel saving when large downrange redesignations are made. This is true
because the negative errors tend to cause the designation to be short of
the intended target and the LEM is slowed at a greater initial accelera-
tion. The result is that it takes a longer time period to reach the
desired site and thus the fuel cost is increased. For positive errors,
the redesignation is initially farther downrange than the desired site
and as a result, the guidance calls for less deceleration with the result
that with subsequent corrections the desired site is reached in less time
fi:
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than with zero LPD error. It is significant to note that the guidance
in this phase does not result in fuel optimum approaches and the savings
in fuel with the positive LPD errors is associated with slightly less
favorable (but still satisfactory) visibility of the target area during
the approach.
The results indicate that whenever there is the possibility of a bias
•	 LPD error that the operational logic should call for the pilot to re-
designate slightly beyond the target area. Because of the minimum
increment size of LPD corrections, this would simply mean that if the
correction cannot be made exactly with 2 degree increments, then it is
advantageous to redesignate beyond the target by an amount up to z degree.
LPP Increment Size - The LPD increment size of z degree in elevation and
2 degrees in azimuth as proposed by Klumpp in reference 1, is believed
tc be a reasonable compromise between having adequate control of landing
site redesignation and keeping the required number of correction incre-
ments (with Klumpp's method a discrete input must be made for each incre-
ment of change)small. Smaller sizes, such as a degree, would cause the
number of discretes for a given change to be doubled. Although this size
could be conveniently used for refiring the designation, an initial
redesignation of several degrees would probably call for so marry discretes
that the pilot would rave trouble keeping count. A 1.0 degree increment
would be easy to keep count on but would be too coarse to accurately
designate the target area.
Accuracy of touchdown. - The accuracy of an automatically controlled
touchdown will primarily be a function of the accuracy of the last
redesignation and the navigation errors during the subsequent time inter-
val until touchdown is accomplished. The Apollo Mission Specification
lists as a design objective, the ability to land within a 100 CEP of a
landing aid.
During the final phase of the lunar landing approach, the landing radar
performance will reportably be of the order of accuracy of +2 ft/sec
(3 d-). Assumed that the time of actual landing is 2 minutes after the
last LPD update, the navigation system drift will be approximately + 240
.ft Or) because the predominant navigational error is the integrated
velocity error. If it is assumed that the last LPD update is made at a
range to the landing site of 3,000 ft (nominally this would correspond
to about 700 ft of altitude) then a 2 degree LPD 3., error would give a
downrange landing point error of approximately 100 ft and a crossrange
error of about 25 ft. Assuming further that the components of the land-
ing point error can be combined by RSS, the 3,, error would be slightly
elliptical with the semi-major axis, about +265 ft downrange and/or only
slightly more than the 36 value due to navigation errors and the semi-
minor axis just slightly greater than the crossrange navigation error or
t
s-
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+2W ft. Assuming this 3f ellipse is adequately approximated by a circle
of radius equal to 250 ft, the corresponding CEP is 98 ft or roughly equal
to the design objective. For a LPD error of +1.0 degree, the correspond-
ing CEP would be about 120 ft. In either event, pilot :,anual control
upon approaching the desired position could eliminate practically all
errors and a landing within 25 ft of a desired position should be feasible.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
ThF analysis indicates that the fuel penalties associated with LPD
errors of the order of z degree are reasonable provided that the logic
for the initial LPD application is biased to the positive (downrange)
side of the desired target area. The number of redesignations associated
with a 1 degree LPD is about four depending upon the altitude of first
redesignation, b, iz it is probable that additional logic can be devised
that would bracket the target area during the redesignation refinements
and could reduce the total number required to the first redesignation
and two subsequent refinements. The 2 degree increment associated with
LPD updates is believed to be an acceptable compromise between resolution
of target designation,number of refinements and final touchdown point
accuracy.
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